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While the regional economic integration in the former Soviet Union turns out to be highly 
inefficient, there appears to be a stronger interest to the regionalism in smaller groups of more 
homogenous and geographically connected countries of the region, specifically, Central Asia. 
This paper attempts to understand whether the preconditions for the regional integration in 
Central Asia are indeed better than in the CIS in general. Using a new dataset of the System of 
Indicators of Eurasian Integration of the Eurasian Development Bank, it finds that although 
the economic links between the Central Asian countries are more pronounced than between 
that of the CIS in several key areas, this advantage has been disappearing fast over the last 
decade. In addition, the trend of economic integration of Central Asia seems to strongly 
correlate with that of the CIS in general, while Russia persists as the dominant gravitation 
pole for all of Central Asia. Currently Central Asia should be treated as a sub-region of the 
post-Soviet world rather than a definite integration region.On the other hand, however, we 
find that Kazakhstan emerges as a new center for regional integration, which can bear some 
potential for regionalism in Central Asia.  
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1. Introduction 
 The last two decades of independence of the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics 
clearly demonstrated what was probably hidden beyond the centralized Soviet hierarchy – an 
extremely high heterogeneity of the new independent states: both in terms of political and 
economic formal and informal institutions and also results of economic reforms and economic 
performance. This extreme heterogeneity certainly contributed to the emergence of sub-
regionalism as a new regional integration strategy, focusing particularly on the interaction of 
subgroups of (supposedly) more homogenous FSU states (see Dwan and Pavliuk, 2000, for an 
encompassing survey of this process). Classic examples of this potential sub-regional 
cooperation are the triad of Eastern European countries — Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and 
the five Central Asian states. And, whereas the need for greater cooperation and integration of 
Eastern European states is being seriously questioned, e.g. in the light of the alternative EU 
path to integration, many researchers from Russia and the West alike believe that further 
integration of Central Asian states is at least generally speaking warranted (see e.g. Bartlett, 
2001, Gleason, 2001, or Geyikdagi, 2005). However, the success of the formal cooperation 
initiatives in Central Asia has been so far negligible, in spite of proliferation of regional 
bilateral and multilateral agreements (Akiner, 2007; Pomfret, 2009).  
Geographic and economic studies on Central Asia proliferated in the 1990s only to 
subdue in 2000s as the prospect – and, indeed, the distinctive identity of this particular region 
– became much less promising.  Central Asia is still perceived as an “emerging region” 
(Kazantsev, 2008) with multiple competing concepts of its institutionalization and structure,  
and from this point of view its place in the multiple “economic geographies of Asia” and the 
world economy (Yeung and Lin, 2003) is not entirely clear. Fuelled by mushrooming 
economic activities and the importance of its geographic location, the region however draws a 
body of literature on strategic and economic policy implications for various international 
actors including the U.S., European Union, Russia, and China (Rumer et al. 2007, Melvin 
2008). A number of studies focuses on the Central Asia’s potential role of an emerging cross-
road region (Olcott 1996, Rail 2006) while the region’s former land-lockedness in the heart of 
Eurasia is increasingly viewed as an advantage rather than drawback. At the same time, 
UNDP (2005) stresses numerous challenges to development and regional integration such as 
the vulnerability of infrastructure, land-lockedness, high levels of poverty, weak state 
institutions, and political barriers to cooperation.           
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This failure of regional cooperation is in fact not surprising, considering the non-
democratic nature of political regimes in all countries of the region, numerous territorial 
disputes and economic protectionism implemented at least by some countries (like 
Uzbekistan). The aim of this paper, however, is to examine the problem of non-cooperation in 
Central Asia from a slightly different perspective. Using some indirect evidence from a very 
new dataset of the System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration (SIEI) provided by the 
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) in 2009 (see Vinokurov, 2010), we intend to compare the 
development of regional economic ties between Central Asian countries and in the FSU 
region in general. Indeed, the positive expectations for the Central Asian regionalism are 
strongly linked to the assumption that this group of countries “is different” from the rest of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in the sense of more close economic linkages between 
them, which potentially provides a better basis for regional cooperation than in the CIS 
framework. However, as we will show in what follows, there is no evidence of these 
“differences”: in fact, even in the areas where Central Asia experienced closer economic ties 
than on average between the FSU countries, this advantage has been almost lost during the 
last decade. 
In addition, we intend to look at two more specific options, which could make 
regionalism in Central Asia more feasible than in the FSU in general. First, Central Asia can 
be “different” in terms of the influence of an extra-regional actor, potentially able to have an 
impact regional cooperation: so, we examine the role of economic connections outside the 
post-Soviet space – for example, China – and their ability to re-shape the economic 
development in the region. Although the increasing economic interconnections with China 
and other non-FSU countries are well-documented in the literature, we do not find any 
evidence that the extra-regional economic ties have been strong enough to change the pattern 
of the evolution of economic ties in Central Asia: in fact, they are strongly correlated with that 
of the rest of the FSU. Second, Central Asia can exhibit a different power structure than the 
FSU in general, which could be more beneficial for the regional cooperation. Indeed, we find 
some evidence that Kazakhstan slowly turns into a more important “integration pole” with its 
“gravity field” stretching beyond the actual Central Asian regions towards the whole FSU 
space: however, even in this case we remain cautious as to which consequences this change 
could imply in terms of regional cooperation. 
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The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the dataset and the key 
definitions used in this paper. The third section provides an overview of the regional 
integration trends in Central Asia as recorded by the SIEI data. The following section looks at 
three main empirical questions of this paper: the existence of close economic ties in Central 
Asia, the role of China and the rise of Kazakhstan. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Definitions and data 
 Before we proceed to the empirical analysis, it is necessary to clarify the key 
definitions and concepts, as well as to give a brief description of the data. The former task is 
particularly relevant because of the ambiguity of the term “regionalism”, which can in fact 
include a number of distinct varieties (see Hurrell, 1995). In this paper we refer to 
“regionalism” or “regional cooperation” while describing the conscious multilateral or 
bilateral cooperation between individual governments, reflecting itself in establishment of 
regional agreements and institutions. “Regionalization” or “regional integration”, on the other 
hand, describes the economic linkages between countries, which can emerge because of the 
regionalism attempts, but also persist independently of them and even originate instead of 
formal cooperation. An advantage of the SIEI database is that it measures specifically the 
regionalization, using a wide variety of indicators reported by the various public agencies and 
statistical authorities in the FSU countries. 
 The SIEI includes five main indicators describing economic linkages between 
countries. Two of them refer to the “aggregate” linkages in trade in goods and services and in 
labour migration. The remaining three indicators look at the integration in three specific 
“functional” areas: agriculture (grain trade), education and energy (power utilities). The 
separate discussion of these areas allows us not to underestimate the interdependence in the 
key areas shaping the economic development of the countries even if the “overall” integration 
is low. These five indicators are calculated on three levels: ties between country pairs; the 
level of integration of the region in general; and the integration of individual countries into the 
region’s economic exchange structure. The first index allows sustainable economic clusters to 
be identified; the second index reflects the evolution of intraregional integration over time; 
and the third index illustrates the significance of the region for the foreign trade of individual 
member countries. The summary of the calculation approach for the indicators is provided in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
A special advantage of the SIEI data, which makes it particularly suitable for this 
study, is that the indicators are calculated for three regions. One of them (defined as CIS-12) 
includes all FSU countries with the exception of Baltic states, which are now members of the 
EU (and, to be more precise, also includes Georgia and Turkmenistan, which are actually not 
members of the CIS). Hence, it reflects the overall integration patterns in the post-Soviet area. 
The second region (EurAsEC-5) refers to the group of countries, which are currently members 
of the Eurasian Economic Community (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan), a Russia-led group which attempts to go beyond the objective achievable in the 
CIS framework (specifically, towards a customs union). This region can be particularly 
interesting for the comparative analysis, because it indicates a probably “best possible” 
combination of post-Soviet countries in terms of their attitude towards regional cooperation 
with Russia, which could be compared to the Central Asian regional cooperation. The main 
focus of this paper is to look at the third region, Central Asia (denoted as CA-4), which 
includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  
Hence, one can see that of five post-Soviet Central Asian countries CA-4 covers four, 
excluding Turkmenistan. Given Turkmenistan’s closed economic system with strong 
governmental control and severe restrictions on external economic activity, as well as its 
extreme scepticism towards any form of multilateral or bilateral cooperation on the 
governmental level, the exclusion of this country, once again, provides a “best possible” 
picture of the Central Asian region, excluding the “most problematic” country (which would 
probably provide much worse characteristics of the regionalization process in Central Asia). 
The composition of the index is also partly due to the data availability, since there is very 
little coherent statistical information on Turkmenistan present. In what follows we will use the 
terms CA-4 and Central Asia as synonyms, referring to the group of four (relatively) more 
open countries. 
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It is worth noticing that the SIEI is incomplete at least from two points of view. First, 
it does not include any information on the cross-border investment flows: in fact, measuring 
cross-border investments in Central Asia remains a particularly difficult task given very low 
quality of statistical data. Second, SIEI concentrates on interpreting official statistics, which 
can be manipulated due to political reasons and, what is more important, disregards informal 
economic ties. We will discuss this problem, which will become important at least for one of 
the three main research questions of this paper, in what follows. However, in spite of its 
limitations, SIEI as a source of consistent and systematic information on cross-border linkages 
in the FSU region still provides a good set of proxies for measuring the regionalization 
patterns in Central Asia. 
 
3. Intraregional integration and disintegration processes in Central Asia  
To start with, we will summarize the main results of the empirical evidence obtained 
from the SIEI to give a picture of the overall regionalization process in Central Asia. SIEI 
summarizes the information for almost ten years (1999-2008) and therefore excludes the first 
decade of disintegration in the FSU region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once 
again, we are looking at the “best possible” scenario, disregarding the unavoidable initial 
“disintegration push” after the dissolution of the common state and the deep economic crisis 
of the 1990s, which also almost certainly resulted into a contraction of international economic 
ties (for a more detailed discussion see Libman and Vinokurov, 2010). In what follows we 
will systematically consider all five indicators of the SIEI and look at the evidence they 
generate for the Central Asian region. 
As for trade integration in the CIS, the SIEI allows us to conclude that the highest 
levels of integration are demonstrated by country pairs which comprise neighbouring states: 
Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Belarus, Azerbaijan-Georgia, Ukraine-Belarus and Russia-
Kazakhstan. This group of highly integrated country pairs also includes Kazakhstan–Ukraine, 
the only exception to the rule. In the light of this observation, CA-4 is special in that the 
geographic proximity of its member states does not seem to be an impetus to their trade 
integration. Each CA-4 country demonstrates a high level of trade integration with CIS-12, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan being the leaders in this respect, and a much lower level of 
integration with CA-4. The leaders in intraregional trade in CA-4 are also Kyrgyzstan (Figure 
1) and Tajikistan  (Figure 2); Kazakhstan lags far behind (Figure 3).  
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Figures 1 – 3 about here 
 
The index of intraregional trade in CA-4 in 2000-2008 showed negative dynamics. 
However, a similar picture was observed in all other groupings: CIS-12, EurAsEC-5 and 
EurAsEC-3 (Figures 4 and 5). In this respect CA-4 simply followed the overall trend of the 
post-Soviet space.  
 
Figures 4 – 5 about here 
 
The SIEI data on labour migration integration indicate that migration flows in the 
post-Soviet space are aimed at a few large target economies which need foreign workforce. In 
2008 these target economies were Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Unlike trade integration, 
labour migration integration in the post-Soviet space boomed during the last decade. The most 
distinct positive trends in labour migration were observed in the analysis of integration at the 
regional level in CA-4 (Figure 6), which demonstrated sustained growth from 2004, peaking 
in 2006. It should be noted that this growth started from a very low base level and was 
attributable principally to registered labour migration from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan. This 
country pair was a leader in 2008. Another notable observation in CA-4 was the positive 
dynamics in that same country pair, Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan, which allows us to conclude that 
Kazakhstan is becoming a new centre of migration. Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan ranked second. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
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Our analysis of the levels and dynamics of market integration in CA-4 in the energy, 
agriculture and education sectors allows us to draw the following conclusions. Cross-border 
trade in electric power is confined to a few countries. CA-4 appears to be the most dependent 
on cross-border flows of electric power among other post-Soviet groupings. The absolute 
leader in this aspect of integration is Uzbekistan-Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s export of electric 
power is very important for both these economies in the context of their size and also as a 
component of the scheme of hydro-power exchange between them. Tajikistan-Turkmenistan 
and Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan rank second and third, respectively. Tajikistan also has the highest 
index of integration with CA-4, followed by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The lowest level of 
integration with CA-4 is demonstrated by Kazakhstan. In 2002-2008 the energy integration 
index in CA-4 was declining (Figure 7). This decline was especially evident in Kazakhstan, 
and, to a lesser extent, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
The energy integration index was decreasing all across the CIS and the five groupings. 
This decrease was especially pronounced in CA-4 which, nonetheless, remains the leader in 
the integration of electric power markets (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
The SIEI assessments of agriculture integration are based on data on trade in cereals 
which indicate intensive interaction between Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan’s 
leadership in the post-Soviet space. The latter country is present in all three leading country 
pairs: Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan. In this 
context the integration of neighbouring Central Asian and Caspian states is based on the 
export of cereals from Kazakhstan. Trade in cereals between other CIS countries is 
insignificant in relation to their economy size. The level of agriculture integration in CA-4 
declined significantly in 2002-2008 (Figure 9), although in the second half of the period 
under review this decline levelled out into a plateau. The biggest decline in this index was 
observed in Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan ranked second and third, respectively.  
 
Figure 9 about here 
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The SIEI data on education suggests that the most intensive student exchange occurs 
between geographically and culturally close countries, and CA-4 is no exception. The highest 
levels of education integration at the country pair level were demonstrated by Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan. Large countries like Russia or Ukraine are 
traditionally very attractive for students from all over the CIS, but their number remains 
insignificant in relation to these countries’ population. The largest increase in this index was 
recorded in the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan country pair, followed by Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan. 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also demonstrated the highest levels of integration with CA-4 
(Figures 10 and 11). CA-4 is the leading post-Soviet grouping in terms of education 
integration (although with its advantage is minimal), but its student exchange dynamics is not 
nearly as good. Studying in neighbouring Central Asian countries is becoming less prestigious 
than studying elsewhere. 
 
Figures 10-11 about here 
 
The SIEI data casts light on some interesting trends in post-Soviet Central Asia. We 
will attempt to use this quantitative data to find the answers to the three key questions posed 
in the introduction above. 
 
3. Is Central Asia different? 
3.1. Central Asia as a distinct region of the post-Soviet world 
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We have started the paper by claiming that regionalism in Central Asia can be more 
successful because it is somehow “different” from the post-Soviet world in general, 
particularly because of the existence of intensive economic ties. Indeed, there are several 
arguments favouring the emergence of regional cooperation in more “connected” regions in 
terms of economic activity. First, if one looks at the regional integration as a public good, it 
makes sense to produce it at the level of governance at which it can be “internalized” 
completely, which is probably determined by the extent of regionalization in a particular 
geographical space. Second, regionalization supports social ties, and hence leads to greater 
homogeneity of preferences. In addition, it can simply be indicative of greater homogeneity, 
suggesting that the transaction costs of trade in this area are smaller. Third, it can also 
generate stronger demand for economic integration from the private sector (Herrmann-Pillath 
2006). However, our results for even the “best possible” Central Asia (without Turkmenistan) 
are not entirely consistent. 
On the one hand, in all the three areas of functional integration (energy, agriculture 
and education), integration levels are higher in Central Asia than in the post-Soviet space in 
general. This can be explained by the existence of extensive infrastructural links and a 
common social space which is much older than the CIS and even Soviet Union (or, probably, 
even Russian rule over the region). However, the dynamics of sub-regional integration in 
agriculture and education was negative throughout the 2000s; particularly, a decline in the 
education integration index effectively nullified the advantages CA-4 had had over CIS-12. In 
migration integration, CA-4 demonstrated a much slower increase in the index than CIS-12 or 
even EurAsEC-5 (in absolute figures). 
As for total trade, an increase in indices suggests that, as mentioned, each CA-4 
country demonstrates a high level of trade integration with the post-Soviet space and a much 
lower level of trade integration with CA-4, and this trend is becoming stronger. It can be 
safely said that Russia is a more important trade partner for all CA-4 countries (with the 
possible exception of Kyrgyzstan) than any Central Asian country (at least, in terms of formal 
trade). It should be stressed that we are referring to intraregional trade lagging behind 
economic growth and the development of intraregional links, not the shrinkage of absolute 
trade figures. CA-4 demonstrates a slower pace of increase and lower absolute figures of 
intraregional trade: in 1999-2008 this trade grew in CIS-12 by 5.8 times, whilst CA-4 
increased by 4.0 times. The pace of increase was slower in CA-4 than in CIS-12 in all years 
except 2004 and 2007 (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12 about here 
 
 We can conclude that, even if we can describe Central Asia’s potential for sub-
regional integration (which generally exceeds that of the CIS), this potential tended to decline 
during the past decade. It would appear that this can be explained by frictions between Central 
Asian states over distribution of resources, differences in their political courses, and strict 
protectionist policies in foreign trade. However, this is true of Central Asia as a whole only, 
and individual country pairs (e.g., Kazakhstan—Kyrgyzstan) still demonstrate sound potential 
for integration, becoming stronger over time. It should also be noted that the SIEI data only 
included formal trade, whilst informal trade in Central Asia remained strong, despite the 
protectionist policies  - or even benefited from them (Megoran et al., 2005). Central Asian 
states have taken measures to control this informal trade in border regions (e,g,, Uzbekistan’s 
campaign to “strengthen the border” in the Fergana Valley in 2008-2009, which included 
building a fully functional right-of-way, concrete walls and trenches). Even the most 
commonplace events – like a cow crossing the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 
February 2010 (Novyi Region, 2010, February 2) or Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic one 
month earlier (RIA Novosti, 2010, January 19) – can result in serious diplomatic conflicts 
with strong media influence.. 
 Therefore, the SIEI data suggest that currently Central Asia should be treated as a sub-
region of the post-Soviet world rather than a definite integration region. As we have stressed 
above, CA-4 countries have stronger political and economic ties with Russia than with each 
other, and the current level of economic co-operation within CA-4 is no match for these 
countries’ economic and resource dependence on Russia. These factors may well have shaped 
the dynamics of formal regional cooperation projects in Central Asia during the last fifteen 
years, which will be briefly reviewed in what follows. 
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The Central Asian Union (CAU) was founded with the signing of an economic union 
treaty by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1993. In 1994 a treaty on a common 
economic space was signed. In 1998 the CAU was joined by Tajikistan and the organisation 
was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). The CAEC set itself the goal 
of creating a common market of goods, services and capital in Central Asia in several phases, 
from a free trade zone to a customs union, a payments union and a currency union. To this 
end, about 250 agreements were adopted. However, the obligations on free circulation of  
goods merely existed on paper, as did the plans to abolish customs duties, reduce taxes, 
remove other barriers to trade and simplify customs regulation (cf. Kumar, 1998). In 2002 the 
CAES was liquidated after the presidents of its member states signed the Agreement 
Establishing the Central Asian Co-operation Organisation (CACO). Russia joined the new 
organisation in 2004, and in 2005 the members adopted the resolution through which CACO 
was integrated into the Eurasian Economic Community. In January 2006, a protocol was 
signed through which CACO was integrated into EurAsEC. After the Parliament of 
Uzbekistan ratified this Protocol, the CACO was liquidated.  
In other words, the most successful attempt at economic unification of Central Asian 
countries so far was a project with Russia’s participation: the CAEC/CACO could not 
compete with an integration project with a wider post-Soviet format. This statement should 
not be understood as a positive assessment of integration in EurAsEC — the latter, 
undoubtedly, encounters many problems , as it will be discussed once again in the conclusion. 
However, the CAEC/CACO proved incapable of competing even with this not particularly 
efficient structure.  
 
3.2. Central Asia as a sub-region of Eurasia 
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The SIEI data only partially confirm that regionalisation is more successful in Central 
Asia than in the post-Soviet space in general. However, one can also consider the same 
problem from a different perspective: it is possible that the basis for comparison selected is 
not perfect. One of the most interesting issues of post-Soviet integration is associated with the 
transition from the post-Soviet integration proper to the Eurasian format of integration. For 
example, whereas in the western part of the CIS the subject of discussion is essentially the 
impact of the European Union and its neighbourhood policy, in the east, China is readily 
accepted as a new potential centre of gravity for Eurasia — primarily by Central Asian 
countries. The latter fact is illustrated by recent integration initiatives at the regional and sub-
regional levels (Savkovich 2006, Paramonov et al., 2008; Kasenova 2009), and by the 
practical co-operation of Chinese and Central Asian players (Wu, Chen, 2004; Peyrouse, 
2007), both formal and informal (cf. . Levinsson, Svanberg, 2000; Swanstroem 2003; 
Raballand, Andresy 2007; Kaminski, Raballand 2009), although there are also some less 
optimistic assessments of the scale of interaction between China and Central Asia (Li, Wang 
1999). It is certainly possible to mention other potential partners like Iran and Turkey, which 
also seem to have keen interest in the region and can have influenced its economic 
development – although China seems currently the most interesting country to explore. 
The presence of strong extra-regional actor can in turn have significant consequences 
for the Central Asian regionalism, both positive and negative.  In our opinion, the SIEI data 
can be used to assess the relevance of this problem for Central Asia. If, say, China (or any 
other neighbouring country) is really exerting a decisive influence on co-operation in the 
region, it would be logical to expect significant deviation of Central Asia’s integration trends 
from the post-Soviet mainstream. In that case, any differences between the development 
trends of Central Asia and the rest of the post-Soviet world may be interpreted as signs of the 
strengthening of the role of extra-regional actors . But our data suggest that integration in 
Central Asia almost fully follows the trends observed in the CIS. This is true of all integration 
and macroeconomic indices without exception; any possible deviations relate to dynamics, 
not the development trends. Therefore, based on these indirect indices we can assume that the 
role of China and other “non-FSU” neighbours falls short of that of a dominant player in the 
region – at least for now.  
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In any event, Central Asia remains part of the post-Soviet space, also (as shown in the 
previous sub-section) in rapidly following the overall trend of the disintegration in the FSU. 
Hence, it is not surprising that Myant and Drahokoupil (2008) claim that the degree of self-
sufficiency of Central Asian states has increased since the Soviet epoch, although the slow 
process of integration into the global economy continues. Hence, being part of the FSU space 
does not mean that the post-Soviet space format is optimum for Central Asia’s integration into 
the global economy or that it can provide it (and the rest of the post-Soviet space) with an 
impetus for economic growth – on the contrary, it simply suggests that no viable and 
attractive alternative has been realized yet. Given high transportation costs and low access to 
international markets (Raballand et al., 2005; World Bank, 2009), in this context, the search 
for other multilateral integration alternatives in Eurasia (Linn, Tiomkin 2006) deserves close 
attention. Regionalism in Central Asia should be extraverted rather than introverted in nature 
(Boonstra, Emerson, 2010). 
The conclusions drawn in this section should not be overestimated. Firstly, they are 
based on indirect indices, as our data do not allow us to make any direct assessment of the 
flow of benefits and production factors in the region. In addition, they, as mentioned, ignore 
informal trade. Secondly, our analysis does not allow us to differentiate between the external 
influence by post-Soviet countries on Central Asia and the internal factors, which might be 
similar in SIC-12 and CA-4 and, therefore, lead to similar development trends. It is important 
to understand this difference in order to assess the prospects for formal integration or select 
countries for the purposes of formulating economic policies for private or state players. 
Whereas external influence warrants integration initiatives and an analysis of groupings when 
formulating a foreign trade strategy at the CIS level (not CA-4, as we covered in the previous 
section), any uniform internal factors leading to disintegration worsen the prospects for 
Central Asian and CIS integration alike. The latter factors also make the  very interpretation 
of CIS-12 and CA-4 as a region questionable, calling for bilateral relations based on the 
specific features of individual countries. The conclusions shown in the previous section 
suggest that we consider the combination of internal factors (protectionist foreign trade 
policies) and external influence (the close ties with Russia), but that at this stage we cannot 
differentiate clearly between them. 
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Thirdly, and particularly important, the key assumption on which our analysis is based 
can be criticised.  It is possible that, say, China’s influence on Central Asian countries 
produces the same effects as Russia’s and post-Soviet space influence – therefore, we should 
not expect any deviations in the development  trajectory of Central Asia. Although we would 
not be able to answer this criticism using our data, some arguments in favour of our 
interpretation do exist. Consider specifically the case of China as the strong “external” player. 
China and the post-Soviet space having similar influence on the development of Central Asia 
appears to be questionable not least because Chinese businesses use Central Asian countries 
(Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan) as a springboard to the region’s economy as 
a whole. In that case, the activity of these businesses would have translated into an increase in 
intraregional trade, whereas the latter fell, even in comparison with the CIS (remember that 
we disregard informal trade). Russia, at the same time, is less interested in such springboards, 
as Russia traditionally has strong positions in all these countries, and is less active in 
consumer markets (where this springboard strategy makes sense). In any case, we must 
emphasise that our conclusions require careful interpretation. 
Finally, it is possible that the impact of the extra-regional agents resulted not in a 
change of path of the integration or disintegration, but rather in the change of speed. 
Specifically, one could expect faster disintegration of the Central Asian region than of the rest 
of the FSU, if the influence of extra-regional players (China or Turkey) were increasing. 
However, in this case, first, one would not observe the correlation between FSU and Central 
Asia in the areas where regional integration showed a positive trend (like labour migration) – 
however, there seems to be a strong correlation in our data. And second, the degree of 
“internal” disintegration within Central Asia would be more slowly than that between Central 
Asian countries and Russia – however, the SIEI data demonstrate that the latter in fact 
declined more slowly than the former. So, even if the extra-regional agents indeed caused the 
“fast track” disintegration in Central Asia, it has been “just” enough to dissipate the specific 
sub-regional integration advantages, but “not enough” to reduce its links to the FSU 
significantly. 
 
 
 
3.3. Kazakhstan: the second integration core in the post-Soviet space 
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Our analysis suggests that Central Asia retains its status as a sub-region of the post-
Soviet space. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that regionalisation in the CIS 
progresses in an asymmetric manner with Russia being a dominant player (which is 
inevitable, bearing in mind in the size of the Russian economy). Integration is principally 
confined to bilateral relations between Russia and individual CIS countries. In the meantime, 
our data indicates that a new centre of regionalisation is emerging in the post-Soviet space: 
Kazakhstan.  
In particular, we can point to two directions of Kazakhstan’s development as an 
independent integration core whose activities are not influenced by Russia. The first direction 
is labour migration. Kazakhstan attracts workforce from the rest of the post-Soviet space for 
many reasons: its rapid economic growth in the 2000s, the problems encountered by labour 
migrants in Russian society, etc. Kazakhstan is especially attractive for migrants from its 
closest neighbours, the Central Asian states. From 2002, Azerbaijan also demonstrated 
sustained growth  of labour migration to Kazakhstan.  
The second direction is trade integration. In particular, as mentioned, all leading 
country pairs trading in cereals include Kazakhstan; this trade covers Central Asia (even 
including Turkmenistan) and the Caucasus. According to the SIEI data on these leading 
country pairs, an increase in an individual country’s index of integration with CA-4 coincides 
with an increase in that country’s index of integration with Kazakhstan (Figures 13, 14 and 
15). These trade relations are different in content: for example, Kazakhstan’s integration with 
Caucasus involves, on the one hand, grain transit through Azerbaijan and subsequently Iran 
and Georgia to foreign markets in North Africa and Middle East, and second, grain exports 
through Baku to three states of Southern Caucasus themselves, with the first factor being far 
more important. Moreover, as discussed, the only country pair which has no common border 
but is leading in terms of total trade indices is Kazakhstan-Ukraine; notably, this pair also 
demonstrated the biggest increase in trade integration in the post-Soviet space in 1999-2008. 
In other words, unlike the situation in migration integration, Kazakhstan shows signs of 
activity outside Central Asia. 
 
Figures 13 – 15 about here 
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Undoubtedly, the evolution of Kazakhstan into an independent integration core was 
made possible by its high GDP level, unmatched by any other Central Asian country. This 
makes Kazakhstan very attractive to its neighbours in terms of trade and migration integration 
and increases its importance as a source of investment. Indeed, according to some empirical 
studies (Golovnin, 2009; Vinokurov, 2009), Kazakhstan is a leader in terms of investment and 
banking expansion in the CIS. Consequently, the perception of the post-Soviet space as a  
unequivocal single-centre region needs to be revised, although its two regionalisation cores 
are very unequal in size.   
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper attempted to look at the process of regional integration in Central Asia 
using a new comprehensive dataset of the SIEI. Our goal was, specifically, to understand, 
whether Central Asia is in any respect “different” from the rest of the former Soviet Union: 
first, whether the degree of regional integration between the countries of Central Asia is 
higher, than between, say Russia and Central Asian states, and second, whether the trends of 
economic integration in Central Asia are different from the rest of the FSU (suggesting, for 
instance, an  influence of an external party like China). So far we are cautiously able to say no 
to both of the questions. While Central Asia has exhibited higher level of integration in some 
functional areas in the later 1990s, in the 2000s the decline of this integration was more 
pronounced than in the rest of the FSU and currently the advantage seems partly to have been 
lost. Moreover, the difference between Central Asian countries and the rest of the FSU has 
been rather the speed of (dis)integration than the direction of changes. 
Although this evidence is indirect, it could suggest that the economic, political and 
cultural heritage of the Soviet period (common infrastructure, language, similar governance 
and education systems, etc.) and Russia’s continuing economic and political influence in the 
region are more persistent than specific factors attributed just to Central Asia. On the one 
hand, from the theoretical perspective it implies that studying Central Asia separately from 
the FSU space is still unpromising: the links to the FSU can be stronger than within the CA-4 
group. On the other hand, from the policy perspective it means that a purely Central Asian 
regional cooperation project at the moment seems to be hardly viable – as the OCAC 
development has clearly shown.  
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The latter claim, however, should be interpreted with caution – although we see 
limited possibilities for the introverted regionalism in Central Asia, the chances for a 
successful regional integration project within the FSU framework (say, CIS or even 
EurAsEC) are questionable, too (although the establishment of the Russia-Kazakshstan-
Belarus Customs Union in 2010 is thought-provoking) . From this point of view, this paper 
suggest rather a pessimistic view on regionalism in Central Asia: the most “appropriate” 
format for the cooperation according to the existing economic linkages is at the same time 
also highly problematic in terms of feasibility of any regional cooperation on a deeper level. 
Hence, the way to even stronger disintegration and autarky, also supported by internal 
developments in politics of the Central Asian countries, seems to be open.  
A slightly more optimistic point of view is possible for our third result. Another trend 
we were able to find is the evolution of Kazakhstan into the second integration core in the CIS 
and, in particular, Central Asia. Kazakhstan is the leader in labour migration and student 
exchange. This was made possible by its high GDP level, unmatched by any other Central 
Asian country, which makes Kazakhstan very attractive to its neighbours in terms of trade, 
migration and education integration and increases its importance as a source of investment. 
The emergence of Kazakhstan as an integration core could have particular importance for 
Kyrgyz Republic, which even now has very strong economic and political ties to its northern 
neighbour. However, even here we believe that caution is necessary because of the natural 
resource-driven nature of Kazakhstani strong economic growth in the 2000s., which could be 
unsustainable in the future  
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Table 1. Integration indicators in the EDB’s SIEI   
Indicator Country pair Country-to-region Region 
A. General market integration 
Mutual trade (Country’s share in the 
total foreign trade 
turnover of the country 
pair + country’s share in 
the total GDP of the 
country pair) *100 / 2 
(Country’s share in trade 
with the region in the 
total foreign trade 
turnover of the country + 
country’s share in trade 
with the region in the 
country’s GDP) *100 / 2 
(Share of the countries’ 
mutual trade in their total 
foreign trade turnover + 
share of the countries’ 
mutual trade in the 
region’s total GDP) *100 
/ 2 
Migration Share of labour migrants 
from each country of the 
pair working in the other 
country(thousands 
people)  in the total 
population of the country 
pair (million people) 
Share of labour migrants 
from the country working 
in the region (thousands 
people) in the total 
population of the country 
(million people) 
Share of labour migrants 
from all countries of the 
region working in other 
the countries of the region  
(thousands people) in the 
total population of the 
region (million people) 
B. Functional integration in key markets 
Electric power Volume of trade in 
electric power between 
the countries of the pair 
(thousands kW/h) / their 
total GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in 
electric power between 
the country and the region 
(thousands kW/h) / the 
country’s GDP (million 
USD) 
Volume of trade in 
electric power between 
the countries of the region 
(thousands kW/h) / the 
region’s GDP (million 
USD) 
Agriculture Volume of trade in 
cereals between the 
countries of the pair 
(tonnes) / their total GDP 
(million USD) 
Volume of trade in 
cereals between the 
country and the region 
(tonnes) / the country’s 
GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in 
cereals between the 
countries of the region 
(tonnes) / the region’s 
GDP (million USD) 
Education Number of students from 
each country of the pair 
studying in the other 
country (person) / total 
population of the country 
pair  (million people) 
Number of students from 
the country studying in 
the region (person) / 
population of the country 
(million people) 
Number of students from 
all countries of the region 
studying in other the 
countries of the region 
(person) / total population 
of the region (million 
people) 
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Figure 1. Kyrgyzstan’s trade integration index 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 2. Tajikistan’s trade integration index 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 3. Kazakhstan’s trade integration index 
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Figure 4. The dynamics of the intraregional trade index in CA-4 in 2002-2008  
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 5. The dynamics of trade integration in three post-Soviet groupings 
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Figure 6. The dynamics of the intraregional labour migration index in CA-4 in 2002-2008  
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Figure 7. The dynamics of the energy integration index in CA-4 in 2002-2008 
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Figure 8. The dynamics of energy integration in three post-Soviet groupings 
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Figure 9. The dynamics of the cereals trade integration index in CA-4 in 2002-2008 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
 32
Figure 10. The dynamics of the education integration index in CA-4 in 2002-2008 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 11. The dynamics of education integration in three post-Soviet groupings 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 12. Increase in intraregional trade in CA-4 and CIS-12 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 13. Azerbaijan’s index of agriculture integration  
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 14. Kyrgyzstan’s index of agriculture integration 
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Source: calculation based on the SIEI 
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Figure 15. Turkmenistan’s index of agriculture integration 
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